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A
major theoretical as well as political approach to transport
infrastructure investment and management is the idea that such
services are public goods and should not be subject to private
market considerations. However, from time to time, public provi-
sion seems to fail, which increases the importance of various forms of private
sector participation:
Over the last 20 years there has been a significant realloca-
tion of responsibility for transport infrastructure, including the
devolution of power to local authorities and autonomous public
bodies … and the growth of private finance. These changes have
had an important influence on the way which transport infrastruc-
ture is planned and managed.
–  Sheila Farrell
This has happened in developed and less developed countries and such
events might be related to contextual and/or internal matters. During the 1970s,
the debate whether transport infrastructure should be provided by the public
sector or through market mechanisms reappeared. In developed countries, the
political environment changed becoming more liberalised. Private sector ori-
ented policies were strengthened and a new belief in competition emerged with
the decline in state intervention (Nijkamp and Blaas 1994; Maskell 2001; Debande
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2002; Goetz 2002).1 The view that public governance was the vehicle for ensuring
the greatest welfare to the greatest number of people came under question.
Redirection also resulted from the public sector’s inability to shoulder costs.
Huge investments before the 1970s were followed by insufficient investments
(despite continued passenger and freight traffic growth) as funds were,
increasingly, needed to finance social services and public debts (Duffy-Deno
and Eberts 1991; Rathery 1993; Walker and Smith 1995; Banister and Berechman
2000; Debande 2002). Finally, authority from the national government was
transferred to regional and private groups (Maskell 2001; Bickerstaff et al.
2002). The transfer of power closer to the people strengthened public partici-
pation at local levels.2
These policies, adopted generally by developing countries (WB 1994;
Gwilliam 1997; ADB 2000), were also adopted by the Philippine government
in 1992 as new directions for development were set up.3 Urban and rural
areas were integrated through road network improvements, thereby strength-
ening the interaction between industry and agriculture. The private sector
was seen as the main engine for growth and development (Thompson and
Villacorta 1996; DPWH 1999; WB 2000a) and laws stimulating private partici-
pation in public infrastructure were enacted. The Local Government Code
enacted in 1991 coincided with this. The Code decentralised political gover-
nance down from national to local level. As local funds were transferred
mainly from the national government’s tax base, this had implications on
public infrastructure provision.
Aim and questions
The main purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate recent practices in
Philippine transport infrastructure policies, with emphasis on market-oriented
policies and decentralized governance. The following question is addressed:
✦ In what ways have more recently adopted policies affected plan-
ning, provision, and financing of public road infrastructure on
national and local levels since the early 1990s?
1 Others argue that the focus on liberalisation and privatisation is overvalued and overestimated. Changes
in planning have concentrated on legislative rather than policy outcomes (Banister 1994; Allmendinger
1997, 2002; Westholm 2002). Further, and referring to developing countries, Ghosh Banerjee and Munger
(2004) found that a privatisation policy is much more likely to be a crisis-driven, a last ditch effort to turn
the economy around, rather than a carefully chosen policy with explicit, long-term goals.
2 The balance between the government and the public has shifted in other ways. For a long time, the
government could implement large transport infrastructure programs with little public consultation. This is
much harder to do at present (Grant-Muller et al. 2001).
3 Exploring options of privately owned and operated infrastructure projects started in the late 1970s and
early 1980s in some better performing developing countries (Augenblick and Custer 1990).OLSSON 249
Studies covering outcomes of policy implementations in developing
countries are scarce (Bollard and Pickford 1998; Debande 2002).4  In the
Philippines, the World Bank (2001) reports that no such study is available:
“Devolution in the Philippines started in 1991, but no system-
atic evaluation has yet been made of how local governments have
actually performed in delivering the functions devolved to them or in
alleviating poverty. The evidence so far is anecdotal but mixed. It is
now time for stock taking to take place.”
While attention is given to performance on national level, the empirical data
from and the performance on the local level is of considerable importance as it may
confirm and/or back-up other papers (based on secondary data and/or theoreti-
cally oriented) dealing with transport related issues in the Philippines. This paper
is an introductory analysis of performances of the government on national and
local levels. A complete analysis would include a more thorough assessment of
public and private investments in the transport sector on national and local levels,
a comparison between rural versus urban local government performance, and
current constraints to an effective decentralization of governance and financing of
public roads.
Outline
Next section provides a theoretical discussion concerning decisionmaking, financ-
ing, and organisation in infrastructure planning, especially road infrastructure. The
discussion considers planning theory, in general, in a developed and developing
country perspective. The third section starts with a discussion on material and
method. Then, it focuses on Philippines’ development problems, its relation to trans-
port infrastructure and measures to solve this through policy changes on national
and local level. A peripheral rural municipality with poor transport conditions consti-
tute the local case. Major conclusions are outlined in the final section.
DECISIONMAKING, FINANCING, AND ORGANIZATION
In order to understand the objectives behind the changes taking place in the
Philippines, a number of planning theories and organizational models are hereby
considered. Issues such as who should provide transport infrastructures, on what
level should project-planning be taken, and is the state or the private sector the
best performer and/or financier are addressed.
4 Debande (2002) meant that literature on local economic studies assessing outcomes from
privatisation initiatives in infrastructure were scarce. A few exceptions are usually performed by
international institutions.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 250
Decisionmaking
State- and market-led planning
Keeble sets the direction of planning by stating that “Planning is the art and
science of ordering the use of land and the character and siting of buildings and
communication routes so as to secure the maximum practicable degree of economy,
convenience and beauty” (Keeble 1952). State-led planning was, at least until the
1960s, based on the opinion it works for the ‘good’ of society at large and the
people living within it (Banister 1994; Allmendinger 2001). It is believed that market
economies perform badly when utilising public resources. If companies,
organisations or individuals only plan for their own short-term benefits, the likeli-
hood of negative consequences is greater. Contrary, market advocates stress there
is too much bureaucratic planning. Planning should be based on market principles
in order to increase efficiency.
The opinion of state-led has, from time to time, been criticised. During the
1970s, socialists stressed that planning was an arm of the capitalist state and a
legitimisation of the capitalist system. Weberians stressed that the state served
societal interests, which were more and more controlled by a rational and indepen-
dent bureaucracy. Since the 1980s, there has been a re-establishment of neoclas-
sical principles and the company state concept, wherein the market is liberalized,
the private sector is the efficient provider, and the state’s role is reduced to a
facilitating function.5 In contrast, transport planning was, according to Banister
(1994), quite immune from a theoretical debate until the thoughts of neoclassical
economics emerged.6 Prior to this, the debate was mainly concerned with organiza-
tional structures within the public sector and user and operator subsidies. It was
seldom questioned whether organisation should be in the hands of the private or
public sector and their different principles of resource allocation.
Functional and substantive rationality: working toward sustainability
The discussion above is related to rationality. Basically, rationality means that the
alternative chosen among several alternatives is the one which best provides the
decisionmaker’s material interests and noticeable good (Nyström 1999). Coincid-
ing are the assumption about maximization of profit and the principle of least
effort. A critique is the belief that each planning step can be analysed and isolated
from the wholeness in order to perform an objective analysis. Friedmann (1987)
identifies two types of rationality: functional (market) and substantive (equality).
5 Bollard and Pickford (1998) take New Zealand as an example where a reversal of government
intervention, ownership, and regulation toward liberalization and free market operation started in the mid-
1980s in an attempt to improve the economy.
6 Sweden is an exception with a huge state investment in a national railway network. Railway building
in New Zealand, which started during the 1870s, was also state-financed (Bollard and Pickford 1998).OLSSON 251
Providing unreserved self-interest for private individuals and companies is related
to the former. The functional rationality lack coordination but as long as some
individual or company improves their situation without negatively harming oth-
ers, societal economic efficiency increases. The substantive rationality is based
on the view that a person is part of a social group where the collective interest is
greater than the sum of all individuals.
Substantive rationality is motivated as long as the public interest is pro-
tected. But, since the private sector’s role in a market economy is vital in creating
jobs, planning must provide for its support. There must be a mutual balance. This
perspective is important when considering transport infrastructure, as there is a
distributional and equality responsibility to provide transport infrastructure to all
groups and locations. Parallel to this is the relation between benefits and costs,
both related to private sector participation. Since the mid–1990s, functional and
substantive rationality are included in the concept of sustainability. Here,
sustainability does not only encompass the environment and ecology, but also
economic, financial, and social sustainability. In transport planning, this has been
influential, although criticized for its contradictions (Gwilliam 1997; Gakenheimer
1997) in formation of transport policies in the developing world. According to the
World Bank (1996), sustainability of transport policy includes several aspects. It
must ensure that a continuing capability exists to support an improved standard of
living and economic and financial sustainability. It must generate the greatest
possible improvement in the general quality of life, not just an increase in traded
goods and environmental and ecological sustainability. Finally, benefits must be
equitably shared by all sectors of the community—social sustainability.
The major criticism against the rational planning theory is the insecurities
within large planning projects, making this sort of planning hard and often
resulting in failures. Insecurities relate to imperfect forecasts, future change in
demand, household conditions, or societal views. There is an inherent conflict
of objectives in this planning theory. It has no obvious tool for choosing
between the distributive and the most cost-benefit efficient alternative. If a
policy of rationality is followed, it may end up in sharp contrast to the distribu-
tive goal. This problem arises in cases with very little economic viability for
the private sector to participate.
In the 1980s, a perspective (referred to as the bottom-up perspective)
focusing on local governance, cooperation, and limited central authority, grew
stronger. It is believed that decisions are best formulated when taken closer to
reality they are taken. The expected benefits from decentralization—improved
efficiency and equitability in service delivery, less national government
expenditures, and greater participation and democracy—should result in more
popular consent and political stability. However, the perspective is problematic. ItPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 252
neglects the systematic organisation of society, in the case of the transport
system, the build-up of network connectivity. Substantive rational arguments
from regionally or nationally organised cooperations or interests will not be
considered properly. The opposite (a top view) opens up for lobbing, where
stronger regions may outperform weaker ones.
So far, the discussion has presented three major issues within planning:
state- versus market-led planning, functional and substantive rationality, and
bottom-up versus top-down planning perspectives. More recent planning
perspectives view the private sector as a complement to the public. The problem
of attracting the private sector, especially in transport infrastructure, has
directed attention to private-public partnership alternatives where both govern-
ment and private market participation is necessary. This is discussed further in the
third section of this paper.
Planning and financing models in practice
East Asian practices
Much attention has focused on the East Asian countries due to their exceptional
economic growth rates. Building of infrastructures is seen as a core government
function (Hossain et al. 1999) and of critical importance in their development
strategies. Others (WB 1993) stress that the East Asia countries have been
subject to a combination of policies. Neoclassical advocates say that the
government’s role in economic decisionmaking was limited and should be handed
over to market forces. Others would want the governments in some countries to
support individual sectors and that the levels of and variation of protection across
sectors were greater than those recognised by the neoclassical advocates. The
government allows the market to work on its own in areas where it can and
intervened where market forces can not. Another view recognises the diversity of
policies and how a mixture of policies contributed to efficient economic man-
agement. The main reason for growth is government flexibility. Policies not work-
ing are abandoned while those working are retained.
Data from East Asian countries show that government is more successful in
providing infrastructure and creating pro-investment conditions for private sector
participation compared to other low- and middle-income economies (WB 1993;
Antipolo 1996). Some countries, e.g., Taiwan and South Korea, also allocate a
larger share of public investment to rural areas.
The role of global institutions in the 1990s and policy change in developing
countries
The multilateral lending institutions’ attitude towards private sector participation
since the 1990s is generally positive but cautious (Gwilliam 1997). While the WorldOLSSON 253
Bank (1993) acknowledged state-led intervention in infrastructure provision in
East Asia, it still proposed options (WB 1994) where the private sector, commercial
principles, and increased competition had advanced roles:7
✦ public ownership and operation by enterprise or department;
✦ public ownership with operation contracted to the private sector;
✦ private ownership and operation, often with regulation; and
✦ community and user provision.
Outcome was hinged upon the private sector’s strength, the government’s
administrative capacity to regulate private suppliers, the performance of public
sector providers, and the political consensus for private provision. A shift ap-
peared with Sustainable Transport: Priorities for Policy Reform (WB 1996) where
no justifications for direct state provision of service in transport operations (not
even under competitive arrangements) could be supported. However, it was noted
that participation came in different forms, financing was restricted to few countries
and limited to ports, airports, trunk roads, and freight railway.
Privatization in itself can have numerous meanings. Recent policy prescrip-
tion, adopted from developed countries, to mobilize funds includes denationalisation
(direct sale of public assets), deregulation (introduction of competition in former
monopoly sectors), incorporation of public enterprises, service contracts, man-
agement contracts, leasing concessions and build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme.
BOT scheme, which is similar to leasing concession, is a form of privatisation
without direct sales. That is, ownership reverts back to the public sector at the end
of the contract. The main advantage for the public sector in such arrangements lie
in the promise of better project design, construction, and operation without hav-
ing to shoulder construction costs (Debande 2002). Contracts usually run be-
tween 30–50 years, wherein the private sector generates cash (tolls and fees) to
pay back the debt service and provide dividends to the shareholders of the project
company. In such a setting, the public sector purchases a service, not an asset.
Within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all countries,
except Singapore and Brunei, planned or had initiated private sector initiatives
during the early 1990s (Lall and Tay 1996). Two initiatives were prioritised: (i)
privatisation of commercial entities, airlines, telecommunication, and electric utili-
ties; and (ii) transfer of rights, with or without the sale of assets, mainly through
BOT–arrangements where the state transfers the right to private firms to provide a
service under specific construction and operation obligations.
7  According to Stiglitz (2003), both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund resisted to
acknowledge the East-Asian countries growth because they did not follow their recommendations,
instead they followed their own outlined development strategies.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 254
Another measure, proposed by the World Bank in mid–1990s, was commu-
nity cost-sharing for improving rural access (WB 1994; Howe 1997). Those af-
fected should bear significant costs and participate in decisionmaking. Cost-shar-
ing arrangements would also apply for maintenance of roads with the condition
that communities not able to cover costs would pay back funds. This has been
successful primarily in developed countries, e.g. Sweden and Finland (Howe 1997).
Also, in sub-Saharan countries where the extension of user-involvement in re-
source allocation and management has been transferred to user-managed road
authorities (Gwilliam 1997). The criticism comes from the impracticality of taxing
poor people in rural areas. The amount of money collected may be insignificant in
relation to the cost of collection, as there is no money to collect.
Bottom-up perspective
Many developing countries also adopted bottom-up policy in the 1990s (Mashiri
2001; Kimsan 2001). Decentralization, participation, equitable allocation, and local
knowledge became important. Programmes were enacted where responsibility for
administrative and developmental decisionmaking and service delivery were
decentralised to local authorities. The concept of decentralization was central
meaning the kind of devolution entails that the authority lies in the hands of the
local government to plan and decide what is to be done (Bird 1994). Although
viewed as democratic and sprung from local needs, the bottom-up planning
perspective is also criticised. For example, decentralisation is not synonymous
with the ability of local governments to deliver. In reality, especially in poor rural
areas, resources are scarce, technical and political institutions are weak, and civil
societies are fragile. If more expenditure responsibilities are decentralized, the
amount and quality of services will suffer. Meanwhile, if more revenues than
expenditures are decentralized, local revenue mobilization is likely to decline.
Implementation of projects will take place without first handing over of resources,
competent decisionmakers, technocrats, and deep involvement by civil society
and their organizations.
Benefits and problems related to new financing policies
Relieving pressured governments from additional financial burdens is the main rea-
son behind private sector participation. Thereby, the government can direct more
attention and resources toward social sectors and help vulnerable and poor areas.
Advocates of private sector participation maintain that the sector’s con-
tribution to development, in particular infrastructures, have been hampered by
institutional shortcomings, weak corporate governance, unclear regulations,
anticompetitive behaviors, and corruption (Allmendinger 1997; Bollard and
Pickford 1998; ADB 2000; ADB 2001a). Compared to the public sector, the privateOLSSON 255
sector uses (when properly regulated and operating under competitive market con-
ditions) resources more efficiently (Debande 2002). Arrangements financed by the
private sector make operators more accountable. In case of cost overruns, costs fall
on the shareholders or lending institutions for privately-financed projects, while in
public ownership the public sector shoulders extra costs. Finally, the private sector
creates jobs. As it is believed that sustained growth creates jobs and the private
sector is the largest source of employment, it should be regarded as a provider.
In case of BOT arrangements, the public sector pays for the service only if it
meets required standards, as the same operator is in charge of both construction
and operation. If the same entity builds and sells the services and is only remuner-
ated for successful supply of services, there will be no intention to reduce the
quality of services provided. It will also avoid reasons for cost overruns or choos-
ing inefficient technology since the operator’s future revenue depends on a flow
of quality services from the asset.
Using private capital also deal with problems in developing countries:
✦ lack of and large capital outlays, long period of investment return,
irreversibility of spending, and contingency on macroeconomic
parameters;
✦ unclear and unstable political decisions, discouraging private
investors; and
✦ insecurities among transport demand, both passenger and goods.
Problems with private sector financing are reinforced when considering ru-
ral areas, especially poor rural areas, which are perceived with risks and low finan-
cial returns (ADB 2001b). In developing countries, few road sections are economi-
cally viable in terms of construction, maintenance, and toll ways. Those in favor of
state financing, especially largescale investments in rural and agriculture infra-
structure, stress that the private sector cannot facilitate this due to length of
payback time and low rates of investment return (Banister 1994; Cypher and Dietz
1997; Farrell 1999). In road construction, the private sectors dependency upon
travel demand and its urban location preferential shows this shortcoming. For
example, road under BOT–schemes are, regardless of country, almost exclusively
implemented in capital cities where major traffic is concentrated (Allport et al.
1998). The remainder are implemented in the densest interurban corridors. Hence,
the private sector can be a replacement and a complement to the public sector,
especially in large infrastructure projects.
THE PHILIPPINE SITUATION
In the review in second section of this paper, it was indicated that there are no
clear-cuts as to what planning model is to be followed or implemented. Instead,PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 256
numerous models and adhoc policies are often practised. Given the real world,
outcomes are uncertain as objectives conflict between authorities and interest
groups with different functions in the fields of planning and implementation. With
this as a background, the aim of the remaining section is to look closer at the
Philippine case, both from a national and local perspective.
Material and method
This section starts with an outline of legislative policies and economic and spatial
development objectives that organizes Philippine transport infrastructure. Evalu-
ation is undertaken through documents and national transportation plans, and
legislative policies as published by national and local authorities and international
institutions. It also includes data and interviews collected and conducted at the
local level in 1999, 2001, and 2005. The analysis focuses on outcomes of measures
on national and local level. The time-perspective is from 1990 onward. Choice of
study area is based on the municipality’s peripheral rural characteristic and long
history of poor road transport conditions thereby representing an area included in
the government’s integration strategies.
Goals, policies and financing in the 1990s
Historically, the Philippines transport sector has been publicly owned, regulated
and operated. Investment has been government-led (Allport et al. 1998; ADFAT
1998) and paid through budgetary resources or borrowings. Most infrastructure
projects have been built under direct supervision by the government or a govern-
ment agency or utility. Despite huge borrowings from lending institutions and
bilateral donors, especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, the country failed to
attain economic growth. A large share of the capital was invested in the road
sector.8 This, together with insufficient maintenance, poor technological skills and
institutionalized corruption, led to skepticism towards continued borrowings for
infrastructure investments.
In 1992, the new government’s policies were oriented towards liberalized
trade, institutional reforms, privatization, and attraction of foreign direct invest-
ment. Integration of urban and rural areas to stimulate interaction between indus-
try and agriculture was a goal. A persistent problem has always been the poor
interconnectivity between the local and the national road networks. To accom-
plish this, transport infrastructure investment was needed, in both urban and rural
8  Skepticism from international lending institutions and bilateral donors towards developing countries
concerned government’s provision of loans and aids in public infrastructure planning (Heyman 1965;
Heggie 1995; Ahmed 1997; Gwilliam 1997; Leinbach 2000; Banister and Berechman 2000). Other major
deficiencies were failure to maintain existing assets and to utilize these efficiently. A large share of this
capital (since World War II) went into the transport sector, especially road construction.OLSSON 257
road network, as roads carry an overwhelming share of the passenger and freight
traffic (NEDA 1992; ADB 1997). As total road network length was considered
sufficient, upgrading and maintenance were prioritized.9 The policy was new and
reverse to Asian Development Bank ordinates that focused on maintenance
during the 1980s and construction during the 1990s (ADB 2001c). Also, the
renewed interest in private sector participation and financing resurfaced.
However, decentralizations in governance, management and increased
private sector financing started prior to 1992. Policies toward increased private
sector financing was initiated through the creation of the Committee on Privatization
in 1986. The work to reduce urban-rural gaps and local government dependency
on the national government in matters concerning local development were also
initiated in 1986 and, finally, materialized with the enactment of the Local Govern-
ment Code (LGC) in 1991. The code brought major changes:
✦ decentralized responsibility for delivering certain basic public services;
✦ additional regulatory and licensing functions of the local government;
✦ increased funds allocated to local governments from the central
government; and
✦ participation by nongovernmental organizations and private sector in
local governance.
While the Code gives extended self-governance to the 1,600 municipalities,
it also brings responsibility to perform comprehensive land use plans, develop-
ment plans, full implementation of the agrarian reform programme, and new func-
tions such as environmental management and various licensing responsibilities.
Responsibilities and financing
New responsibility and funding policies since the local government code
enactment in 1991
In the Local Government Code, it is stated that development and funding of roads
are to be shouldered by the public sector—national roads through the national
government and local roads through local government (NEDA 1998). Despite the
turnover of responsibility of local roads from the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) in 1991, the DPWH improved local roads (when local govern-
ments had problems) until 1998 (ADB 1999a). In 1997, the Congressional Initiative
Funds for local roads were almost as big as DPWH regular highway budget. Thus,
9  In 2000, approximately 20 percent of the Philippine road network was paved (asphalt or concrete), up
from 14 percent in 1990, as well as in 1960 (DPWH: various years). The remaining was paved either with
gravel or earth. Asphalt/concrete ratios on national, provincial, municipal, city, and village roads between
1990–2000 increased from 49 to 58, 12 to 21, 26 to 35, 67 to 77, and 1 to 7, respectively.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 258
the DPWH and other government agencies were still involved in local roads, but
with less budget, authority, and dedication.10 According to ADB (2000), guide-
lines of responsibility between agencies involved must be clearer. Another
deficiency in the planning process has been the failure of DPWH to analyse
overall network needs (ADB 1997; Coronel 1998; Allport et al. 1998). Priorities and
planning were not only determined by technical and economic analysis but were
also highly politically influenced. This had impacts on funding allocation and
project selection.
Responsibility and funding of local roads in the 21st century continued with
the guidelines from the 1990s (NEDA 2001). In the Medium-Term Development
Plan 2001–2004, several national government departments were identified as
funding agencies for improvement or construction of local roads. These roads
should assist the national roads to improve access to priority agricultural areas,
urban/industrial centres, and tourism areas. 11
Internal revenue allotments
Through the LGC, local governments are entitled to internal revenue allotments
(IRA) from the government’s tax base. Of total IRA, at least 20 percent should be
allocated for development projects in coordination with the local government
development plans. While IRA’s share of local governments total receipts
constituted 40 and 64 percent in 1991 and 2000, respectively, dependency differ
considerably (ADB 1999b; Balisacan and Hill 2003). In the late 1990s, IRA share
from total revenues spanned between 35-90 percent among highly urbanized and
rural local governments. Dependency is partly reflected by the ability to attract
private investments. Local governments with huge tax bases, mainly those located
in urban areas and cities, are more attractive for private investments compared to
rural areas. Hence, a low local tax base has repercussions on the road infra-
structure stock.
Despite IRA, local government spending in economic and social services
sectors between 1993–2000 remained on quite the same level while spending in
transport and communications contracted compared to prior the LGC implementa-
tion between 1985–1991 (Balisacan and Hill 2003). Metro Manila, Central Luzon,
Southern Tagalog (both adjoining Manila), and Central Visayas (home region of
Cebu City, the second largest city) had highest capital expenditures. Poorer
10 Except from DPWH, the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Depart-
ment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
invest in local roads (ADB 2001d) as part of broader national government projects aiming at improving
agriculture, environment, irrigation, etc.
11 Improving access to agricultural areas fall in line with the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act
(enacted in 1997) where each region should identify strategic agriculture and fisheries zones.OLSSON 259
regions hardly experienced any increase at all. This is related to the decen-
tralization process. Local governments, especially those in poor municipalities
and provinces, do not have funds to perform development functions and IRA
does not cover the extra costs incurred by the devolution of responsibilities (Alonzo
1999; WB 2000b). For example, between 1992–1993, almost 70,000 national govern-
ment personnel were transferred to the local level and ended up on local govern-
ments’ payrolls. IRA also has a disincentive effect to collect local taxes more
efficiently, especially where IRA cover expenditures. Finally, the local govern-
ments’ limited assessment skills and tax evasion are a problem (Krinks 2002).
Other fund sources and revenues
Except for IRA, local governments are authorized to allocate fund sources and
revenues. Revenues may be local taxation, rentals and usage of public property,
tax from businesses and issuance of permits, fees and licences. Funds include
loans from financial institution or assistance from foreign aid donors, grants from
central government or other domestic agencies (e.g., the central government-ad-
ministered Municipal Development Fund). While access to the banking system
and government funds has been low and directed to better-off municipalities, the
ability to raise local revenues also favors more well-off regions. In year 2000, three
regions—Metro Manila, Region IV-A (the two representing the country’s manu-
facturing belt), and Central Luzon—collected around 70 percent of all local taxes
collected by local governments (Balisacan and Hill 2003). Local governments in
cities raise more revenue than those outside the urban areas.
Private participation
Since 1992, the infrastructure sectors have undergone structural changes through
privatization (transfer of ownership and management), deregulation, and liberal-
ization (dismantling monopolies and oligarchies) (NEDA 1998; Serafica 2000).12 As
the government’s capacity was insufficient, private sector investments were
essential. A system encouraging private sector participation and financing had
been endorsed in 1973 (Presidential Decree 1113) but was not carried out due to
political obstructions and delays. According to Serafica (2000), the government’s
impetus for change in policy was not a result of theory or ideology, but rather
disenchantment over the performance of the various sectors under the old regime
(both public and private monopoly provision) and shortage of public funds (insuf-
12 Provision of rural infrastructure is complex institutionally and costly in terms of administration and
supervision. Donors have, with limited success, tried to improve the local road network’s weak condi-
tions and institutional capacity (WB 1995; ADB 1999a). Another problem is insufficient revenue collection
and tax evasion (Manasan 2000; IMF 2002; ADB 2003; Balisacan and Hill 2003). If tax revenue collection
fails in the national level, few resources trickle down to local governments as IRA.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 260
ficient saving rates). Increased transport demand, due to sustained economic
growth, also resulted in more liberal policies (NEDA 2001).
Through the enactment of the BOT law in 1990 (amended in 1993), the pri-
vate sector’s role as the main engine for national growth and development was
acknowledged. BOT schemes provided the private sector with ways to invest,
construct, operate, and maintain projects. So far, BOT schemes in the road sector
(Table 1) has been a failure (DPWH 1999; WB 2000a; ADB 2000; NEDA 2001) while
performance in other infrastructure sectors has been more successful (see Llanto
2004 for review). Until 2002, only three private-public partnership projects, all
directed towards Manila, had been completed or were under operation (DTI 2004).13
No significant private sector road project has been implemented outside of Metro
Manila (WB 2000b). As a comparison, in 2002, official development assistance
(ODA) in physical infrastructure (ongoing and/or approved projects) was higher
than BOT investments (Llanto 2004). Of the total US$7.413 million ODA invest-
ments, US$4.556 was directed to the transport sector and US$2.542 to the road and
bridge subsector. Of the total US$7.304 million BOT investments, US$3.312 was
directed to the transport sector and US$1.866 to the road and bridge subsector.
Table 1 shows, among others, that:
✦ solicited and unsolicited BOT projects on local government unit level
are very limited, BOT projects take place on national level;
✦ the total transport sector and road/bridge subsector received only 24
percent and 11 percent, respectively, of total solicited and unsolicited
national and local government unit BOT projects, while the power and
water sectors received 38 and 34 percent, respectively;
✦ no BOT project was allocated to the transport sector or the road and
bridge subsector on local government unit level; and
✦ of the road subsector, at least three (Metro Manila Skyway, Manila–
Cavite Toll Expressway, and Manila North Luzon Tollway) were projects
under private-public partnership (joint ventures).
13 The regional growth strategy, initiated in 1992, focused on one growth center in each region outside
Manila, which would be provided with necessary infrastructure to support industrialization. The “flagship
concept” was introduced to focus on strategic projects within and between growth centers. However,
several centers are not operational as there are too many centers scattered throughout the country
competing for the same investment and industries (NEDA 1998). This strategy is not new in the
Philippines. It follows similar planning attempts in the 1950s. Planners were positive, initially, to the idea
of several secondary cities in a network. Later, they stressed that, perhaps, it was more economic to
have growth in the primate city, Manila (Ullman 1980). Of the total 42 BOT-projects completed, opera-
tional, and awarded until December 31, 2004, three were in the transport sector: (i) The Light Rail Transit
Line No. 3 (MRT 3), (ii) The Metro Manila Skyway (Stage 1), and (iii) The Manila-Cavite Toll Express-
way. The three projects totalled US$1.2 billion equivalent to 7.5 percent of total US$16 billion invested in
BOT-projects (DTI 2004). Of the 42 projects, 29 were in the power sector, five in the water sector, and four
in information technology, property development and others. Of all projects, the US$7 billion water
privatising project of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) stands out.OLSSON 261
Table 1: National government and local government unit solicited and unsolicited BOT
projects as of March 31, 2002 (estimated project cost in US$ million)
Transport
Power Roads Others Water IT* Others** Total
8.729 1.587 1.139 7.406 272 532 19.667
6.241 550 655 7.175 65 415 15.101
2.488 443 - - 207 - 3.138
-- -- - 1 1 7 1 1 7
- 594 484 114 - - 1.192
-- - 1 1 7 - - 1 1 7
5 - - 14 0.4 58.5 79.6
-- -- - 2 4 2 4
5 - - 14 - 14 33.6
-- -- - --
- - - - 0.4 20.5 20.9
-- -- - --
850 1.208 2.121 1.193 - 9 5.372
- - - 600 - - 600
850 478 1.121 165 - 9 2.623
-- -- - --
- 730 1.000 68 - - 1.798
-- -- - --
- - - 350 - - 350
- - - - 15.5 15.5
-- -- - 44
-- -- - --
-- -- - --
- - - - - 11.5 11.5
9.584 2.795 3.260 8.613 272 615 25.134
Note: Costs may not match completely with totals due to rounding.
*  Information technology.
** E.g. property development, waste management.
Source: Author’s summary from Llanto 2004
National solicited BOT projects
- Completed/operational
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construction)
- Bidding stage
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(ICC/local sanggunian) / for
price challenge
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- For first pass ICC/local
sanggunian approval
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Several problems—such as constitutional restrictions against foreign par-
ticipation in most infrastructure sectors to 40 percent partnerships with local com-
panies, currency depreciation (ADFAT 1998), macroeconomic instability, low do-
mestic savings, low demand outside Metro Manila, and political instability—re-
stricts private sector participation in the transport sector. In road infrastructure
projects, the major problem has been “right-of-way” acquisition (Llanto 2004). The
problem to attract private funding was apparent when the 1998 Philippine Trans-
port Strategy Study noted: “The relationship between the government and the
private sector does not necessarily represent an optimal division of risk and
responsibility (NEDA 1998).”
The local level – case study of Infanta municipality, Quezon province
Since the LGC enactment, local governments responsibility for project planning,
funding, and implementation has increased. As a planning body, the local
government is believed to have more local knowledge and, therefore, better
prepared to make decisions and improve implementation efficiency. For instance,
according to Alonzo (1999), many studies on the devolution process have found
successful cases where local government units have improved efficiency in
village road construction, spending only T! of the costs of similar roads con-
structed by the DPWH. While having this in mind, it should also be remembered
that initial experiences of local governments as a transport authority in the early
1990s was carried out under financial constraints. The problem to attract private
investment in rural areas was a persistent problem in the 1990s and was acknowl-
edged in the Medium Term Development Plan 1999–2004 (NEDA 1999). It was
stressed that in remote rural communities with weak markets, the government
may provide necessary assistance. As more major infrastructure in urban areas
was to be performed by the private sector, the government could allocate more
funds to rural areas.
Lack of funds is a main reason for the local networks poor condition.
Low creditworthiness, poor access to long-term funds due to a weak capital
market, and political instability (the short three-year term for local officials)
explain weak private sector involvement in local government infrastructure
project. Other reasons are various fund sources, lack of coordination, and
absence of an allocation system prevent efficient and sustainable manage-
ment of the network.
Several national government agencies are engaged in local roads to some
extent. Roads can be built without any local government consultation or coordina-
tion. Thereafter, roads are handed-over to the local government for maintenance
but without budget allocation (ADB 2000; 2001d). The LGC stresses that national
agencies with implementation functions shall coordinate with the local govern-OLSSON 263
ment and ensure their participation, both in the planning and implementation of
projects. While actor’s priorities may not be in accordance, local governments
often accept due to weak financial capacity. This is a response to cost-sharing
between national agencies and local governments where the former subvert the
process of devolution by demanding cost-sharing. Funds from national agencies
are used to implement projects at the local level, regardless of local needs, because
local governments cannot come up with matching funds due to insufficient IRA.
To raise funds is related to control of budget. Despite decentralization and devo-
lution, national agencies control almost 80 percent of budgetary resources, leav-
ing much of project design and budget control in the hands of these agencies, not
the local governments (WB 2000b).
The LGC states that: “A local government may enter into contracts with any
duly prequalified individual contractor, for the financing, construction, operation,
and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure facilities, under the BOT
agreement...”  The local development council should confirm BOT agreements.
Further, it is the municipal engineer who prepares the plans and specifications for
BOT projects. After publishing a project to the public, open bidding starts where
the lowest bidder is awarded the contract if it complies with minimum require-
ments. Once a contractor is selected, he/she should be entitled to investment
return by authorizing the contractor to charge and collect reasonable tolls, fees,
and rentals for using the project facility not exceeding those proposed in the bid
and contract. Collection of charges should not exceed 50 years. During this time,
the contractor shall provide all necessary maintenance and repair needed. Even
though the BOT law allows LGUs to enter into BOT arrangements with private
investors, there has been a lukewarm interest. Only one local government infra-
structure project has been completed under the BOT law, another three has been
awarded, seven are under development, and 13 appear on a potential short list
(Llanto 2004).
Infanta, 1990–2001
Given what has been discussed so far, it is of interest to study what has
materialised in a real case on local level. In order to investigate how policies has
been implemented on the local level, the remaining part of this section deals with
Infanta municipality, Quezon province. Infanta is a rural agricultural municipality
located approximately 150 kilometers east from Manila along the Pacific Ocean.
Total population in year 2000 was 50,000. The municipality’s total road length
measured 215 kilometers between 1990–2001, spread out over 340 square kilome-
ters, among 36 villages. Of total road length, village roads constitute 53 percent,
national roads 29 percent, provincial roads 17 percent, and municipal roads only
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Transport infrastructure condition between 1990–1994
Between 1990–1995, no road constructions or improvements on the municipality’s
network were undertaken (Infanta 1995). While the streets in Infanta town proper
were paved, the street condition was very poor, only four out of 18 were classified
as having above 50 percent good condition. Condition on village roads was even
more insufficient. Of 32 village roads, 11 were partly paved with concrete. Gravel
covered 75 percent of the total length and earth, 20 percent. Half of all the roads
had very poor condition and only less than a tenth of the village roads were
very good.
Transport infrastructure improvements since 1995
With the incoming local government in 1995, institutional reforms, tax collecting
skills, and various licensing and permit fees were introduced. Institutional reforms
followed policies in the LGC, e.g., public and private partnership and participation
in political decisions affecting the community. Transparent bidding procedures in
public projects were also introduced. Finally, the local government appropriated
(in accordance with the LGC) 20 percent of total IRA for development projects. In
line with the national government policy, the local government has also focused
on upgrading and maintenance of the road network within the municipality.
Between 1995–1998, 14 village roads were partly paved with concrete. Of
these, five had no concrete before 1995 and the remaining had between 2–13
percent concrete paving. Aside from paving, 22 village roads were maintained and
upgraded, equivalent to 61 percent of all roads. However, measurement often only
covers a few hundred meters. Between 1999–2004, no unconsolidated data is
available for the local government, but given the increase in expenditures (Table
3), focus were on road construction. Aside from the local government, one na-
tional government agency was concerned in the upkeep of local roads throughout
the period—the National Irrigation Administration (NIA 2005) performed mainte-
nance on 12 kilometers of roads in 2004.
Financing and local implementation capacity
Total local government revenues (including IRA) have increased substantially
since the early 1990s in Infanta (Table 2).
Locally generated revenues share of total revenues was very low until
1996, making up only 19 percent in 1994 and 1996. Between 1998–2000, local
revenues increased to between 34–41 percent of total revenues. Seen in a
national comparison, where IRA made up 40 and 60 percent of local government
unit receipts in 1991 and 2000, respectively, IRA made up 60 and 59 percent in
1991 and 2000, respectively, in Infanta. In a national rural government unit per-
spective where IRA’s share of total revenues can reach 90 percent, Infanta’sOLSSON 265
Table 2: Infanta local government unit revenues between 1990–2001
Income category 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001
>From local sources
Revenue from taxation 37 108 134 225 262 344 519 391
Real property tax 172 131 265 292 482 513 361 484
Business taxes 295 425 488 793 1,199 1,594 1,801 1,777
Non-tax revenues 336 - - 132 119 70 360 256
Receipts from economic 212 344 462 695 3,677 8,107 3,490 3,328
enterprises
Fees/charges 38 69 253 414 515 6,321 795 677
Loans and borrowing - - - - 3,354 1,796 9,500 -
Other receipt 699 569 867 1,050 1,687 1,572 3,468 3,156
>From national government
BIR allotments (IRA) 1.706 4,383 10,660 15,873 21,789 26,862 29,565 33,322
National aids - 260 50 - - 581 - -
Total 3,498 6,302 13,183 19,478 33,088 42,073 49,864 43,394
Note: Revenues may not match completely with totals due to rounding.
Source: Municipal Budget Officer, Infanta Municipality.
dependency, being a rural municipality, is much lower. Thus, while the chal-
lenge to increase locally generated resources, especially since 1998, has
been positive (showing both economic growth and improved revenue collec-
tion), dependency on IRA is still considerably high. Locally generated
resources must increase further.
Spending in the transport sector
Given the huge increase in local government revenues in Infanta during the 1990s,
it is of interest to see if this has benefited the transport sector. Table 3 shows
Infanta local government unit’s general fund expenditures, how much of the
expenditures are directed towards the transport sector, and how much of the
20 percent municipal economic development fund (included in the IRA) is
directed towards the transport sector.
Table 3 shows that expenditures in the transport sector are:
✦ mainly financed through the municipal economic development fund;
✦ almost no funds were allocated before 1997;
✦ between 1997–1999, expenditures were very high, spanning between
7.7 to 9.4 percent of total expenditures; and
✦ a decline in expenditures between 2001–2004, spanning between 2.8 to
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Table 3: General fund and municipal economic development fund expenditures, Infanta
municipality between 1991–2004 (million pesos)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
General fund expenditures
￿ Total 4.7 6.5 9.6 13.2 13.3 15.9 23.8
￿ Personal services 3.4 4.5 6.3 7.3 8.3 11.1 14.8
￿ Maintenance & other operational
expenses 0.92 0.95 1.6 1.9 2 1.4 3.7
Repair & maintenance of local roads
and bridges - - - - - - 0.55
￿ Capital outlay 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.2 0.07 - 0.25
￿ Non-office expenditures 0.37 0.39 1.2 2.8 2.8 3.3 5
- Municipal economic development
fund 0.16* 0.38* 0.87 2.15 2.2 2.6 4
Infrastructure development
(no dis-aggregation) - - - - - - 1.7
Construction, repair, maintenance of
municipal and village roads - - - - - 0.25 -
Road projects - - - - 0.37 - -
Concreting village roads and bridges - - - 0.34 - - -
    Bridge projects - - 0.15 - - - -
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
￿ Total 31.1 39.4 45.5 47 47.4 53 58
￿ Personal services 17.6 18.6 21.6 25 26.4 27.7 29.5
￿ Maintenance other operational
expenses 7.5 11.3 12.8 12 10.6 13.2 14.9
Repair & maintenance of local roads
and bridges - - 0.64 0.2 0.35 0.4 -
Construction of local roads & bridges - - - - - - -
Repair, construction, maintenance
roads & bridges 0.5 0.85 - - - - -
￿ Capital outlay 0.05 2.3 2.1 0.02 0.11 0.8 0.4
Construction of roads shoulder - - - - - 0.25 0.1
￿ Non-office expenditures 5.8 7.1 8.9 10 10.3 11.4 13
- Municipal economic development
fund 4.5 5.3 6.8 7.1 7.1 8.1 8.8
Construction of local roads bridges - - n.d.a 1.5 1.1 1.1 2.5
Circumferential road (survey planning) - - n.d.a - - - 0.5
Infrastructure development (support to
village projects) - 2.4 - - - - -
Infrastructure development
(no disaggregation) 1.9 - - - - - -
n.d.a.: no data available.
* Municipal economic development fund not disaggregated.
Source: Provincial Budget Officer, Lucena City, Quezon.OLSSON 267
Thus, the local government unit has allocated a large share of its expendi-
tures to transport infrastructure in terms of percentage since 1997. But, given the
poor condition of the local road network, expenditures in real money terms are
insufficient and the road network deteriorates faster. Finally, seen from an average
local government perspective, where spending in transport and communications
contracted (despite IRA) compared to the period before the LGC implementation
(between 1985–1991), it may be assumed that the Infanta case shows the opposite.
Even though no disaggregated data exists for the period between 1985–1991, the
poor investment record between 1991–1996 indicates this.
Besides spending shown in Table 3, the Office of the Municipal Agricultur-
ist (OMA) applied for funds through the national Department of Agriculture in
2001 to gravel 21 kilometers of earth roads which were not passable during the
rainy season (OMA 2005). However, OMA had not received the funds applied for.
The National Irrigation Administration maintenance work in 2004 was funded by
the national government (NIA 2005).
No private capital has been invested in transport infrastructure nor has
there been any private-public partnership project implemented. Being rural and
agricultural, economic activities and vehicle densities are very low which makes it
difficult to attract private capital and to implement BOT-projects. Neither has there
been any private sector investment in the transport sector in the first district of
Quezon province, according to officials at the DPWH first district headquarter
(DPWH 2005). The DPWH is, nevertheless, engaged from time to time in road
projects in Infanta. The road between Infanta town proper and Dinahican village is
classified as national and, therefore, falls under DPWH’s responsibility. However,
implementation is very slow. In late 1999, concreting of a couple of hundred meters
was carried out. Then, concreting started once again in 2001. In 2005, approxi-
mately six of the 12–kilometer road stretch is concreted. Funding takes place through
the Countrywide Development Fund system (pork barrel). The Congress hands
out funds allowing congressmen to allocate money for projects in their constitu-
encies. The projects must be implemented by a government agency. Allocation
often coincides with election.
For the local government to allocate funds to upgrade the road network
covering 114 kilometers (excluding national roads) is an improbable task, espe-
cially if the local government is the main financier. Deterioration has reached levels
where the local governments ability to cover costs and facilitate technical skills is
not possible given present conditions. As a consequence, inadequate transport
infrastructures continue to be a persistent problem. Whether the local government
is able to shoulder costs will most likely boil down to priorities and development
objectives. While the local tax base is, theoretically, growing as total population
increased from 35,000 in 1995 to 50,000 in 2000, a huge majority belongs to poorerPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 268
strata, earning even below the level exempted from income tax. As such, these
people contribute almost nothing to the local government budget, while they, at
the same time, need and demand various social services.
While there are a number of local construction firms present, the problem is
in their capacity. Commonly, these firms have licence category C only, which means
that they are only allowed to contract small projects (excluding roads and bridges).
According to one construction firm, they applied to upgrade their certificate in
1999 to enable them to acquire road and bridge projects up till three million pesos.
However, due to lack of experience, the application was not approved. This was
the most skillful and experienced local private construction firm. Another firm
expressed ‘inconveniences’ on local government level. The local government prom-
ised projects to the firm if they could borrow capital to invest in a truck enabling
them contract larger projects. The promise was withdrawn. One can only question
whether these instances are expressions of institutional corruption where the local
government impedes private firms from acquiring capital and licenses to hinder
them from acquiring projects.
CONCLUSIONS
Through the Local Government Code enactment in 1991, much of the national
government’s responsibilities (local roads among others) were handed over to
the local government unit. At the same time, private sector participation in
transport infrastructure provision was encouraged and regarded as the engine
for national economic growth and development. Change in policies may also
have been an outcome of the national government’s dissatisfaction with previ-
ous poor performance and shortage of public funds. At present, it seems that
many of the previous problems found at national government level have, through
decentralization and privatisation, been relocated down to the local level. Such
policies work for the detriment of economically weak rural areas, if not sup-
ported properly. Policy changes have had implications, both on national and
local levels.
In terms of performance, the increase in IRA from the national government
down to the local government units has been substantial since the implementation
of the LGC. However, other responsibilities devolved to the local government unit
outperform the funds allocated. As such, expenditures allocated to the transport
sector, particularly the road subsector, may have increased in terms of percentage
spending but still insufficient in terms of real money. It is the richer regions (with
much higher tax base and an attractive environment for private investments) where
spending in transport and communications have increased. Whereas, in poorer
regions, spending hardly increased at all. However, there are exceptions. The
Infanta case shows that spending increased substantially in terms of percentageOLSSON 269
and real money, although at a very low level and still very much insufficient. As a
result, the local road network deteriorates faster in comparison to funds allocated
to improve its condition. Despite increase in locally generated revenues since
1997, Infanta municipality is very dependent on IRA.
Private sector participation and investments, as well as private-public
partnership projects, in the road subsector has been a huge failure since the
implementation of the BOT law. Except for a few projects on the national level, no
road project has been implemented by the private sector or through private-public
partnership in rural areas. Numerous risks perceived on the national level and poor
transport demand (both passenger and goods) owing to small population and low
economic growth reinforce the private sector’s reluctance to invest in projects
in rural areas. The Infanta case also shows that no such projects have been
implemented in this rural agricultural municipality. As for the future, if the urban
areas are unable to attract private investment, it is unlikely that such investments
will find its way down to the local government unit in rural areas. This will put
further pressure on already strained local government budgets. Adding to this is
the local construction firms’ insufficient implementing capacities and/or whether
they are prevented from entering the market. Such obstructions have a long
history in the country.
Other implications are poor institutional skills, lack of a uniform method
to choose infrastructure projects, and involvement of numerous actors with
implementing power. These result in ambiguous and politicised process of
selection at the local level. In 1995, the incoming mayor of Infanta implemented a
more strict bidding process, tax collection, and implementation of the municipal
economic development fund. This shows the importance of political will (or an
entrepreneurial politician) to implement the responsibilities devolved through the
LGC. However, the Infanta case also shows how the local government unit’s power
to restrict the private sector from participating in construction projects can bring
about dissatisfaction. Finally, involvement of other actors is very limited in Infanta.
Taken together, this has implications on distribution of resources, especially
between urban and rural areas. Distribution of transport infrastructure, not applied
to a general planning strategy, run the risk of being disadvantageous for ‘less
attractive’ areas when private sector provision increases. Also, when local
governments are responsible for local roads, differences in levels of economic
well-being reinforces spatial disparities. Rural municipalities with limited revenue
resources and tax base run the risk of falling further behind by being dependent on
the national IRA. This dependence is risky as national revenue collection is a
major problem. When national revenue collection fails, IRA to the local govern-
ment unit also suffers. Too much dependency on IRA may also be a disincentive
for the local government unit to generate revenues.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 270
In summary, the government’s overall goal in the early 1990s to integrate
urban and rural areas (thereby linking the industry and agriculture sectors) by
improving the road network has been a failure, so far. Funds are simply not enough.
Insufficient funds (previously in the hands of the national government), failure
to attract the private sector and encourage private-public partnerships only
meant that the huge problem has just been relocated from one administrative
level to another.
As for the future, and viewed in a wider context, the poor interconnectivity
between the national and local road networks together with persistent poor road
condition due to lack of maintenance have repercussions on the overall economic
development. Owing to the location pattern of the Philippine manufacturing sector
in Manila and its adjoining provinces in Region III and IV–A (the country’s manu-
facturing belt together with Metro Manila), a large share of public expenditures
have been allocated to these regions. The cemented location pattern works as a
detriment for economically weak rural provinces and municipalities. This has been
an everlasting problem in Philippine history and dates back several hundred years
ago when Manila was chosen as a harbour for the Spanish galleon trade and grew
to become a primate city in the East. Whether decentralization attempts and in-
creased private sector participation will alter this situation is, perhaps, too early to
judge. But after almost 15 years since the implementation of the LGC and the BOT
law, the road network is still in a sorry state.OLSSON 271
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